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Abstract  
The subjective well-being approach to the valuation of international development is applied to the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The rich countries have particular preferences for 
education, healthcare, and housing; they need compensation for failure to meet the targets by 
2015. The poor countries view all the targets as important; they can accept compensation for 
failure to achieve the targets by 2015, with amounts equivalent to what would have been 0.7% 
proportion of the incomes of the rich countries for international aid. The MDGs are affordable 
and doable, yet the rich countries are foot-dragging in fulfilling their pledges for international aid.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite being the foremost international agenda for addressing extreme poverty and other income 
poverty-related problems like illiteracy, under-five infant mortality, maternal health, HIV/AIDS 
and other diseases, progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been mixed. 
Large gaps remain between the targets for 2015 and the accomplishments so far. In an assessment 
report for the MDG Summit held in New York City last September 2010, the United Nations said 
that ‘unmet commitments, inadequate resources, lack of focus and accountability, and insufficient 
dedication to sustainable development’ (United Nations, 2010a: 4) put at risk the completion of 
the MDGs. The United Nations also noted that the experience in the past decade demonstrates 
that the gains on the MDGs were made possible because of the ‘adequate funding and political 
commitments’ (ibid.) from the international community. If public support and action remain half-
hearted as evidenced by recent experiences, there can be no doubt that the promise of the MDG 
would remain just that – a promise. The quick turnaround of positions toward fulfilling the 
commitments made in 2000 and pledges for international aid is of critical importance to sustain 
the gains and accomplish all the targets by 2015. Five years are enough to accomplish the MDGs. 
But the call to action remains urgent.  
 
The difficulties confronting the task set out in the MDGs are for the most part derived from the 
low political interest of governments as well as the lack of concern of societies, especially among 
the rich countries, to the plight of poor societies. Financial resources or capacity is limited in the 
poor countries that they cannot solve the problems on their own. International aid is needed to 
achieve two ends: first, to move people out of extreme poverty, illiteracy, poor health, and 
homelessness; and, second, facilitate the stimulation of domestic economies so the poor countries 
can move toward higher levels of economic development and thus be independent from aid.  This 
endeavour is a complicated project but it is not a difficult problem to solve. Proper planning and 
sound management of programs in conjunction with effective leadership along with appropriate 
international aid can make the MDGs possible. 
 
One way to ascertain public sentiment and determine the possibilities for collective action is to 
measure preferences for public policy issues. This task is usually done using a monetary valuation 
of preferences. However, the standard procedures are not without problems. Issues like the use of 
surrogate or pseudo markets (in, hedonic pricing and travel cost procedures) or the introduction of 
some hypothetical goods (in contingent valuation procedures) could produce misleading results. 
A similar problem could occur when the responses suffer from strategic bias, anchoring problems, 
and scaling effects. 
 
The happiness literature offers an alternative procedure, which is called the subjective well-being 
(SWB) approach to preference valuation. Welsch and Kühling (2009) and Frey et al. (2010), for 
example, survey the literature.1 Overall, this procedure parallels the standard approach in that the 
correlations between self-reported well-being and an external variable of interest as well as that 
between self-reported well-being and income are used to obtain the marginal rate of substitution 
between the external variable and income. What the SWB approach obtains is still a monetary 
valuation of the external variable in the context of individual subjective experiences rather than 
individual choices. The concepts are discussed in the next section, but what needs to be pointed 
out at this stage is that the SWB approach circumvents the aforementioned problems associated 
with the use of a surrogate or pseudo-market or the introduction of a hypothetical good in the 
valuation exercise. The SWB approach is meant to be a complement to the standard procedures. 
 
There is a growing number of studies that use the SWB approach in the study of public issues 
from air pollution (Welch, 2002; Luechinger, 2009), to airport noise (van Praag and Baarsma, 
2005), to cigarette smoking (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002), to civil conflict (Welch, 2008a), to 
commuting (Stutzer and Frey, 2008), to compensatory damages (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008), 
to corruption (Welsch, 2008b), to democracy (Frey and Stutzer, 2000), to education (Michalos, 
2008), to family and social relations (Powdthavee, 2007), to income inequality (Alesina et al., 
2004), to inflation-unemployment trade off (Di Tella et al. 2001), to healthcare (van den Berg and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007), to leisure activities such as watching TV (Frey and Benesch, 2008), to 
                                                 
1 Recent surveys on the economics of subjective well-being are Frey and Stutzer (2002), Frey and Stutzer 
(2005), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), and Stutzer and Frey (2010). 
terrorism (Frey et al., 2009), and to voting (Frey and Stutzer, 2004). There are now excellent 
reviews on the literature (see footnote 1). In this paper, the SWB approach is applied to the 
valuation of individual attitudes toward the MDGs. The contention is that the level of importance 
people put on the MDGs reflects the intensity of their desire to reduce extreme poverty and 
destitution. Different insights can be obtained from this application. In turn, the information can 
be a starting point for collection action toward the MDGs. 
 
Part 2 of the paper presents the conceptual framework then the empirical strategy for the valuation 
of individual preferences. Part 3 discusses the results and the implications of the findings. The last 
part concludes the paper. 
 
2. SWB APPROACH TO PREFERENCE VALUATION 
 
2.1. Conceptual framework 
 
Standard economic analysis relies on individual choices in inferring utility. In contrast, subjective 
well-being (SWB) reverts to classical utilitarianism to anchor analysis on the actual experiences 
of an individual in inferring utility (for example, Kahneman et al., 1997), and the actual stated 
well-being of the person is considered as the true utility of the person (for example, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch, 2006). This reliance on choices as the only metric of utility implies that the actual 
experience of a person is deemed irrelevant to economic analysis, which is intriguing if 
economics aims to improve well-being in the context of scarce resources and unlimited wants. 
Naturally, studies in SWB flourished in disciplines other than economics. Diener and Biswas-
Diener (2010), for example, is a non-technical tour of the psychological research on SWB. From 
Easterlin (1974), but especially from Clark and Oswald (1994), Easterlin (1995), Clark and 
Oswald (1996), Clark (1997), Frank (1997), Ng (1997), and Oswald (1997), economic research 
on SWB grew rapidly in the 2000s to form a distinct approach in economics. 
 
The basic studies find that SWB has an affective component (that is, positive and negative 
feelings) and an evaluative component (that is, self-evaluation of the life of a person).2 Each one 
is directly measurable (Diener et al., 1985); and, at the same time, these components are separable 
from but moderately correlated with each other (Lucas et al., 1996; Diener and Emmons, 1984). 
Studies also find that self-reports have high validation as supported by findings that correlate 
well-being with smiling (Ekman et al., 1990; Pavot et al., 1991) or external ratings of relevant 
others like spouses, relatives, and friends about the person’s well-being (Costa and McRae, 1988; 
Sandvik et al., 1993). People with high well-being are found to succeed in many aspects of their 
lives (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). In any case, Larsen and Frederickson (1999) and Kahneman and 
Krueger (2006), among others, argue that the components of SWB have enough reliability for 
analysis, albeit self-reports may change over time.3 Meanwhile, recent studies (for example, 
Diener et al., 2010) find that measures of positive affect, negative affect, and life satisfaction 
actually correlate separately from the external factors (that is, not the individual profile and 
characteristics) such as average income, environmental states, political conditions, and so forth. 
The argument here is that research can use the association of the external components with SWB 
and obtain the marginal rate of substitution between the relevant components to infer valuation.  
 
Because true SWB (SWB*) is a latent variable – it remains internal to the person – the SWB 
function is deemed as some positive monotonic transformation of SWB*; or, formally, SWB = 
h[U( · )], where U( · ) is SWB* and SWB is the self-report of well-being. Personality traits (Costa 
and McCrae, 1980) and genes (Lykken, 1999) can affect well-being, but external conditions also 
                                                 
2 The ratio of positive to negative affect is a measure of hedonic well-being (Larsen and Prizmic, 2008). 
3 For a survey of the literature, see Bowles (1998). 
play a role and thus correlate with well-being (Diener and Suh, 1999; Inglehart and Klingemann, 
2000; Diener and Seligman, 2004). However, the individual-level indicators are consistent even 
with the substitutions in the external variables and/or introduction of controls for personality traits 
(for example, Helliwell, 2006; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy, 2007). 
 
The SWB function can be expressed as SWB = h(Z, Y, X), where Z is the external variable of 
interest (in this case, the MDGs), Y is income, and X is a vector of individual-level explanatory 
variables. Totally differentiating the expression obtains dSWB = hY dY + hZi dZi + hXi dX. Setting 
dSWB and dX to zero then rearranging the terms obtains the marginal value (MV) of Z; that is, 
MV = 
dZ
dY
− = .
h
h
Y
Z  Income has a positive impact on SWB. If Zi is a public good, hZi > 0; if it is a 
public bad, hZi < 0. The signs of hXi depend on the indicators used.  MV < 0 is interpreted as the 
valuation of the willingness-to-pay to remove the public bad. On the other hand, MV > 0 means 
the valuation of the willingness-to-accept for not getting the public good.  
 
2.2. Method and Data 
 
The structural equation of SWB can be expressed as follows: SWB(Z, Y, X) = α + β·Zi + γ·y + δ·X 
+ ε, where Zi refers to the MDGs, y is the logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 
and X is a vector of standard well-being correlates, and ε is the residual term. Given that true 
SWB is latent, the estimated coefficients are helpful in indicating the direction of relationship 
between the right-hand side person-level indicators and well-being. However, for the valuation 
exercise, the ratio of the coefficients on an MDG and income is of special interest because it 
indicates the marginal value of that item. The indicators are described in turn. 
 
Subjective Well-Being: The measure of SWB is life satisfaction, which is obtained as the response 
to the question: ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days?’ The person responds by locating satisfaction on a 10-point scale with 1 as ‘completely 
dissatisfied’ and 10 as ‘completely satisfied.’ The life satisfaction data are taken from the World 
Values Survey 2005.4  
 
Millennium Development Goals, Zi: People were asked to respond to five MDG queries following 
the main question: ‘I’m going to read out another list of global problems and goals that world 
leaders have set to reduce them. Indicate for each of these goals how high a priority your own 
country’s leaders should give to it.’ The list included: ‘[MGD1] About 25 percent of the world’s 
population lives in extreme poverty – that is, on less than one dollar per day. The goal is to cut 
this percentage in half by 2015. [MDG2] At present, more than 130 million children of primary 
school age are not in school. The goal is to ensure that by 2015, all children will be able to finish 
primary school. [MDG4] About eight out of every 100 children who are born around the world 
die before their fifth birthday. The goal is to reduce this proportion by two-thirds by 2015. 
[MDG5] About five million people become infected with HIV/AIDS each year. The goal is to 
stop the spread of HIV/AIDS. [MDG7] About 840 million people around the world live in slums. 
The goal is to make a significant improvement in the housing of at least 100 million people’ 
(labels inserted for emphasis). There were no questions for gender quality and women 
empowerment (MDG3), environmental sustainability (MDG6), and global partnership for 
development (MDG8).  
 
The person is asked to respond to each of the five items using a 4-point scale, where 1 means ‘top 
priority’, 2 ‘high priority’, 3 ‘medium priority’, and 4 ‘low priority.’ Both ‘top priority’ and ‘high 
priority’ are recoded as 1 so that ‘medium priority’ and ‘low priority’ become 0, thereby 
                                                 
4 World Values Data are downloadable from: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
transforming each MDG item into a yes-no indicator in the regression. As such, a value 1 implies 
that an MDG item needs urgent attention from the leaders of one’s country. There is no indication 
that the respondents were asked to jointly evaluate all five items. Public discussions actually treat 
the MDGs as composed of separable items. Accordingly, for the valuation exercise means, there 
is one regression for each of the five MDG items. The MDG data are available only in the World 
Values Survey 2005. 
 
Income: The World Values Survey does not report individual income, but gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita is used as a suitable proxy. It is worthwhile to mention that debate on whether 
the logarithm of income (for example, Deaton 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008) or the absolute 
income (for example, Easterlin 1974) is the appropriate form for income remains unresolved. The 
economic literature stresses that the logarithm format is the appropriate specification, but the 
psychological literature accepts both formats. Interestingly, the marginal values derived from 
using absolute income and that from the logarithm of income but transformed into levels are 
actually comparable. The view in this paper is in line with the psychology literature. Five year 
average of GDP per capita is the unit used in the regression. Income data are from the World 
Development Indicators.5 
  
Demographics and socio-economic profile: The basic indicators are: (a) age of the person in 
years; (b) gender of the person with male = 1 and zero otherwise; (c) marital status of the person 
with ex-married (either divorced or separated) = 1 and zero otherwise, widowhood = 1 and zero 
otherwise, and being single = 1 and zero otherwise; (d) educational attainment of the person with 
tertiary education = 1 and zero otherwise; secondary education = 1 and zero otherwise; and 
primary education = 1 and zero otherwise; (e) job status of the person with unemployed = 1 and 
                                                 
5 World Development Indicators are downloadable from: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog 
zero otherwise; and self-reported income class in deciles from 1 (or lowest decile) to 10 (or 
highest decile). Demographics and socio-economic profile data are taken from the World Values 
Survey 2005.    
 
The database is comprised of two groups: rich and poor countries. The listing of countries is a 
function of data availability. The first group is composed of United States, Japan, Norway, and 
Switzerland. Each may be interpreted to represent of a cluster of rich countries like large-sized 
superpowers (that is, the United States), large-sized but not superpowers (that is, Japan), and 
other wealthy countries (that is, Norway and Switzerland). Alternatively, the representation could 
be interpreted in terms those that meet the 0.7% of GDP pledge as allocation for international aid 
(that is, Norway), those that meet at least half of 0.7% of GDP (that is, Switzerland), and those 
that fall below a third of 0.7% of GDP (that is, United States, Japan, and Switzerland).6 The 
second group is composed of Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, and Zambia.7 They are among the poorest 
                                                 
6 Data are available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg. Between 1990 and 2005, international aid from 
the rich countries averaged 0.405 percent of GDP, which is roughly 60% the commitment to provide 0.7 
percent of GDP to international aid. The figure is much lower for international aid to the least developing 
countries, which averaged 0.124 percent in the same period. 
  Even before 2008, international aid averaged about 0.41% of the rich countries’ GDP. In 2000, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were the only ones that fulfilled their international aid 
commitments of 0.7% of GDP for international aid. The same countries fulfilled their aid commitments in 
2009. Data from the United Nations indicate that Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden actually allocated 
more than 1% of their GDP to international aid. 
7 The database does not contain data on other poor countries. Data for Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, and 
Turkey are available. However, since the MDGs are principally about giving preferential attention to the 
poor countries, no analysis is done for the upper middle income countries. Preliminary regression analysis 
dos not provide useful results.  
in the world and represent the poor countries of Africa. Two of the four countries are below the 
average income of low income countries (namely, Ethiopia and Rwanda) and the others exceed 
the average income of low income countries (namely, Mali and Zambia). Pooling the countries is 
not advised given the disparity of the socioeconomic standings and differences in the quality of 
domestic institutions. Thus regressions on separate pools are done for the rich and poor countries 
on the presumption that the level of economic development and quality of domestic institutions 
affect individual attitudes toward the MDGs.  
 
The ordered probit procedure is performed on the separately pooled cross-section dataset. The 
procedure implies that people perform ordinal rankings of well-being; that is, the sequence of the 
rankings is similar across individuals regardless of their personality traits, genes, environmental 
setting, and so on. What needs stressing is that the regression results are to be treated with some 
caution because the nature of the data from the World Values Surveys precludes the introduction 
of person-level fixed effects and the correction for endogeneity. Nonetheless, the size of the error 
term is not expected to undermine or reverse the correlation between right-hand side indicators 
and well-being.  
 
Robust test can be performed to ensure that the results remain consistent despite the limitations of 
the dataset. To this end, political personality indicators are added in the structural model (for 
example, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy 2007). Political personality is defined as citizenship and 
interpreted at the local, national, and global levels. Data are obtained as the responses to question: 
‘People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, 
would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
about how you see yourself? [1] I see myself as a world citizen; [2] I see myself as part of my 
local community; [3] I see myself as part of [country name]’ (numbering mine). The person 
responds using a 4-point scale with 1 as ‘strongly agree’, 2 ‘agree’, 3 ‘disagree’, and 4 ‘strongly 
disagree.’ As with the MDGs, ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ are recoded as 1 then ‘disagree’ and 
‘strongly disagree’ are recoded as 0. The effect of recoding is to transform the citizenship items 
as yes-no indicators in the regression. Citizenship data are available only in the World Values 
Survey 2005. 
 
3. VALUATION OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
 
3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 1 contains information on the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the rich and poor 
countries included in the study. The large disparity in standards of living is straightforward to see. 
The income gap, among other socio-economic indicators, is relevant in development discussions 
because it show the intended beneficiaries of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Put 
simply, the poor countries in Africa need preferential attention from the rich countries to see a 
reversal in underdevelopment. What is needed to fulfil international aid commitments at 0.7% of 
GDP – here, shown in terms of per capita – of the rich countries is also indicated in the table.  
Noticeably, the pledges are comparable to the average income of the poor countries. 
 
Clemens et al. (2007) and Easterly (2009), among others, underscore a problem with the MDGs, 
which is that the targets put Africa in a disadvantaged position because the countries there are 
expected to bridge the developmental gap within one generation even as the rich countries took 
several generations to accomplish their development projects.8 Regardless of the conflicting 
views on the nature of the problem to be surmounted, it cannot be denied that, despite very stark 
starting points, the poor countries of Africa have to date made real advances on many socio-
economic indicators even with the mixed results of their accomplishments on the MDGs.  
                                                 
8 See Saith (2006) and Vandemoortele (2008) for recent critical analysis of the MDGs. 
Of course, progress on the MDGs might have become sluggish in recent periods but it is due to 
increased inequality and frequency of crises in many parts of the developing world. Thus, while 
the MDGs initially looked doable within a generation, they began to appear as ambitious targets 
even at the global level. Some have started to point out that less frustration and disenchantment 
could be had if the targets were made more realistic rather than idealized. Nonetheless, the MDGs 
remain useful because they focus attention and mobilize efforts of the rich and poor countries 
toward a collective endeavour to not only understand but also to address extreme income poverty 
and deprivation that confront about 20 percent of the world’s population today.  
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2] 
 
The MDG performance of Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, and Zambia are summarized in Table 2. The 
indicators tell a mixed story. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Zambia seem to be on track on most goals. 
But if international aid falls in 2010 (United Nations 2010b), there might be problems in 
achieving the goals in 2015.  
 
However, there seems to be a general lack of interest among the rich countries in providing the 
needed assistance to the poor countries, despite the fact that the cost to accomplish the MDGs is 
estimated by the United Nations at about 0.54% of GDP of the rich countries. One can therefore 
infer that political apathy and social detachment of the rich countries contribute to the growing 
divergence between the rich and poor countries. Of course, getting the rich countries to provide 
the funds is not a guarantee to success because there are deep structural and institutional factors 
that also need to be addressed but international aid is a necessary condition, if not an essential 
item to the whole development enterprise, to put the poor countries of Africa on the first rung on 
the development ladder. Of course, development is a difficult project and takes a long time to 
accomplish, but once there is movement out of extreme poverty and destitution, complementary 
efforts can be deployed to build domestic capacities in order to sustain progress and begin the 
process of weaning countries from aid.  
 
3.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Appendix 1 contains details of the regressions. The results are to be treated with caution given the 
limitations of a cross-section dataset. Endogeneity is one concern that cannot be addressed, for 
instance. Suffice it to say that the results on the correlates of well-being are consistent with the 
extant literature. They are discussed in turn. 
 
First, the age of the person is positively correlated and exhibits a U-shaped pattern with subjective 
well-being. Both the rich and the poor countries yield the same results, although the magnitudes 
of the coefficients differ between groups. All things the same, therefore, people in the poor 
countries experience relatively lower subjective well-beings whilst they are younger (with an 
estimated turning point at 43 years) than those in the rich countries (with an estimated turning 
point low point at 46 years). Correspondingly, the older people in the poor countries experience 
relatively higher well-beings earlier than those in the rich countries. 
 
The U-shaped pattern between age and well-being is a reflection of the experience of people with 
life in general. As people grow older, their aspirations increase and, at the same time, they take on 
more responsibilities, and so forth. Disappointments come when aspirations and achievements do 
not match. However, people grow view life from a more sobering perspective as they grow older; 
that is preferences can change. They become less disappointed with their life as a result of their 
more mature viewpoint. Of course, the configuration of life experiences can differ across persons 
because of the variations in contexts. Relative to rich societies, people in the poor societies are 
less able to improve their life situations, notwithstanding a desire to achieve change. They get 
frustrated with life sooner, which explains the earlier turning point compared to the people in rich 
countries. Seeing that others are better off makes the poor question why a disparity exists. In 
time, however, they become resigned with their lives and get less frustrated in the process. 
 
Second, the well-being of males in rich countries is, on average, lower than females. The finding 
is not novel given the extant literature. One explanation of the disparity in well-being is perhaps 
gender socialization that puts men as the better sex. There are thus more expectations on males: 
higher wages, more responsibilities, and so on. There is thus the push to strive harder to meet the 
expectations. All things the same, gender socialization thus lead to more frustration with men and 
women. However, the correlation of gender and well-being in the poor countries of Africa is not 
statistically significant, albeit the signs on the coefficients are correct. The size of the coefficient 
actually tells something very interesting, namely: where extreme poverty and deprivation are the 
defining features of society, well-being is democratized so to speak across gender. Thus, in the 
context of developmental work, intervention needs to be mindful of gender equity. 
 
Third, marriage dissolution (meaning, divorce, separation, or widowhood) is negatively correlated 
with well-being. The pattern is consistent across the two groupings, except that the correlation 
between ex-married status (that is, divorced or separated) and well-being in the poor countries is 
statistically insignificant. In the rich countries, the larger negative impact on well-being comes 
from single-hood rather than widowhood or ex-married status, although either state of marriage 
dissolution brings a comparable negative impact on well-being. Looking closely at the results, 
though, there is not much difference in the magnitudes of the coefficients on the marital states. In 
the poor countries, however, widowhood has greater impact than being single and the difference 
in magnitudes of the coefficients is rather large. Perhaps, death of a partner brings heavy personal 
pain and economic hardship considering that insurance and social security are inadequate, if not 
lacking, in the poor societies of Africa. The family burden may be intensified if people realize 
that the death of a loved one (say, due to disease, infection, unsafe childbirth, and so on) was to a 
great extent avoidable if the health facilities, the medical professionals, and the medicines were 
available in their communities. 
 
Fourth, educational attainment is, on the whole, positively correlated with well-being. For the rich 
countries, however, tertiary-level education is the only statistically significant education indicator 
with well-being. The finding is not controversial considering that basic education is guaranteed in 
the rich societies. For the poor countries, there is a positive role of educational attainment to well-
being, with the average contribution of primary- and secondary-level education at about half that 
of tertiary-level education. The results also indicate that primary-level education in the poor 
countries has more impact than secondary-level education. The findings are in line with the view 
that basic education (both primary and secondary) is the key to raising well-being at low levels of 
economic development while tertiary-level education becomes crucial at high levels of economic 
development.  
 
Fifth, unemployment is negatively correlated with SWB except in the poor countries where it is 
not statistically significant. In the rich countries, unemployment is costly – both in monetary and 
non-monetary terms – to the affected person and the family welfare in part because of the high 
cost of living plus and in part the cultural expectations with regards work and being gainfully 
employed. The findings for the poor countries are consistent with the view that there is generally 
little difference in well-being across job status where extreme poverty and deprivation are the 
defining features of a society, suggesting that well-being is democratized in terms of job status. 
 
Sixth, income is positively correlated with well-being. In the rich countries, the contribution of 
income to well-being is larger than that in the poor countries. People in well-off societies can 
afford more goods and services and thus benefit more from their income than the people in the 
poor countries whose principal interest is to first secure the basic needs. However, the results are 
not saying that income can only have little impact on well-being in the poor countries. Rather, the 
low impact of income arises from the fact that there are few economic activities and opportunities 
in poor societies. Thus, with economic development, income is expected to have greater impact 
on well-being. Moreover, people in poor countries can satisfy some of their needs without income 
as is the case of self-sufficient households. 
  
At the same time, results on income decile show that the income class correlates with well-being 
regardless of country standing. It is natural that, all things the same, the upper income people 
have higher well-being than the middle income people; and, in turn, the middle income people 
have higher well-being than the low income people. But the findings here are interesting because, 
unlike income (discussed earlier), the correlation between income class and well-being is smaller 
in the rich countries than in the poor countries. Thus, where standards of living are already high, 
as in the rich countries, the income class does not bring about significant differences in well-
being. Where standards of living are low, the income class is important. In fact, in poor societies, 
the distinctions between classes are more pronounced. 
 
Lastly, the results indicate that there is a general desire among the peoples of the rich and poor 
countries to see that their leaders put high priority on the MDGs. Put simple, people care about 
the MDGs. There are positive correlations between each of the MDG items and well-being across 
both groups of countries, except for MDG1 (that is, cutting extreme poverty by half by 2015) and 
MDG3 (that is, reducing the proportion of child mortality before five years old by two thirds by 
2015) in the rich countries where they turn out to be statistically insignificant. The results 
basically show that people generally see the MDGs as public goods and decisive public policy is 
required to accomplish them. The results further reveal that, at least in the case of the rich 
countries, some of the MDGs are affect public goods; that is, they pull on emotion more rather 
than toward real engagement with the problems on the ground (more below). 
 
Before proceeding to interpret of the findings, robustness tests were performed and the outcome 
confirmed the basic results (see Appendix 2). The findings can be summarized as follows. First, 
belongingness at any of the three levels of political citizenship is positively correlated with well-
being except for community citizenship, which in the poor countries is negatively correlated with 
well-being. The finding is, perhaps, unique to the poor societies of Africa where extreme poverty 
and destitution are concrete and tangible at the local level that people already do not identify with 
their own communities. Citizenship at the national-level is statistically significant only in the poor 
countries, perhaps a reflection of a sense of duty and identification with a nation that is the larger 
tribal- or ethnic-nation and people in such nation are in extreme income poverty and destitution.  
The most encouraging finding on political citizenship is that people in both the rich and poor 
countries see themselves as global citizens, which suggests a sense of belongingness to something 
larger than oneself or country. This finding says that, at the very least, people share a common 
identity – regardless of age, gender, life status, and so on – as citizens of the same Earth and, 
therefore, there is hope that people can work together to solve global problems. In this context, 
there is hope for the MDGs. What may need to be done is to galvanize people to take part in the 
global project of reversing extreme poverty and destitution.  
 
3.3 Subjective Well-being and the MDGs 
 
As indicated in the previous section, the rich and poor countries view the MDGs as public goods. 
The amounts of compensation that people are willing to accept for a failure of the political leaders 
to prioritize the MDGs are presented in Table 3. Consider the upper panel of the table, which 
shows the willingness-to-accept of the rich countries for a failure to achieve the MDGs. The 
figures indicate that the people in rich societies may feel disheartened by the extreme poverty and 
destitution in poor societies, yet they do not consider reducing income poverty incidence by half 
(MDG1) and reducing under-five child mortality incidence by two thirds (MDG4) should be the 
top priorities of their leaders. Rather, findings indicate that the top priorities should be ensuring 
primary education (MDG2), stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS (MDG5), and improving housing 
for the poor (MDG7).  
 
One way to make sense of these results is to focus on the public affairs character of MDG2, 
MDG5, and MDG7. Because basic education, healthcare, and housing are guaranteed public 
goods in the rich countries, if not readily available and inexpensive when acquired through the 
market, the people in rich societies see the deprivations in education, healthcare, and housing as 
injustices that are easily remediable with decisive political action. Basically, the people in rich 
societies need to be compensated for any unpleasant feeling that arise because of the inability of 
their political leaders to give the appropriate attention in reversing illiteracy, poor healthcare, and 
homelessness. Moreover, the results are also saying that ensuring the success on the MDGs could 
be cheaper for the political leaders of rich countries than giving compensation to their people for 
a failure on the MDGs. In addition, an implicit message of the rich countries results is the 
following: international aid is enough to take care of basic education, healthcare, and housing but 
transformations in the structural and institutional factors that bring about or perpetuate extreme 
poverty and destitution in the poor countries is not as important. In a way, helping people in poor 
societies should be limited within the doable limits of international aid. The same sentiment can 
be gleaned with the initiatives of global foundations and other special international interest groups 
working in the poor countries. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
The compensation that the people in poor societies are willing to accept for failure to achieve the 
MDG are shown in the lower panel of Table 3. The amounts are small relative to those of the rich 
countries, but they suggest in poor societies of Africa are reasonable in regards as the acceptable 
payments. Interestingly, these amounts are equivalent to what would have been 0.7% proportion 
of the income of the rich countries devoted for international aid (see again Table 1). Relative to 
the incomes in poor countries, the acceptable compensations would have significant impacts.  
 
Five years to 2015 can be sufficient time to achieve the MDGs if political leaders put their act 
together and do what needs to be done. Of course, the burden remains on the poor countries to 
demonstrate that they possess the capacity to carry out the difficult tasks of reducing income 
poverty, ensuring basic education, reducing under-five mortality, stopping the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, providing shelter to the poor. These targets are difficult to reach without international 
aid because, on their own, the poor countries do not have enough resources and capacities to carry 
out the MDGs. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the rich countries do not abandon their 
commitments in meeting their pledges of 0.7% of GDP for international aid and/or hide behind 
the rhetoric of economic stagnation because of a protracted global financial crisis. The targets can 
be achieved as demonstrated by the experiences in the past decade. Why political leaders of the 
rich countries are doing a lot of foot-dragging in fulfilling their pledges for international aid given 
that the results suggest that the acceptable compensation for a failure to achieve the MDGs is 
much larger than the international aid itself thus becomes difficult to understand. Perhaps, deep-
seated political indifference, social apathy, or even outright disregard of the urgency to pursue the 
MDGs underlies the behaviour of political leaders. This state of affairs suggest that, at the very 
least, the utility function of the political leaders of rich countries does not include the MDGs in 
the same way that the MDGs are included in the utility function of the people in rich countries 
and, in turn, disables the poor countries from moving out of extreme poverty and destitution. 
 
Reversing underdevelopment is a difficult task and takes time to accomplish. Reversals or failures 
could occur along the way. Needless to say, solving extreme poverty and destitution requires the 
participation of everyone; people, civil society, and governments. People in rich countries and 
especially their political leaders have to realize the fact that the poor countries cannot solve the 
problems on their own. Regardless of the political economy of poverty and development, the 
findings in this paper support the view that the MDGs are achievable at low cost compared to 
what is needed to compensate people for a failure in the MDGs. Once again, the amounts needed 
to achieve the MDGs are comparable to what would have been 0.7% proportion of the income of 
the rich countries for international aid. Political leaders of the rich and poor countries need to stay 
the course and remain committed to achieving the MDGs.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper applied the subjective well-being approach to the valuation of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The approach was presented as a useful alternative to the standard 
valuation techniques because it does not use a surrogate or pseudo market setup or a hypothesized 
good in the valuation exercise. Some interesting insights were gathered in the study.  
 
First, the MDGs are public goods in both the rich and poor countries. Second, people in rich and 
poor societies want the MDGs accomplished by 2015 but may accept compensation for a failure 
to achieve them. For the rich countries, the top priorities of the people are ensuring primary 
education (MDG2), stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS (MDG5), and improving housing for the 
poor (MDG7). The public affairs nature of these public goods makes make it easy for the rich 
countries to focus on them. For that reason, it is understandable why there is a sense of injustice 
when basic education, healthcare, and housing are not readily available in the poor countries 
because these public goods are guaranteed, if not readily available and even affordable, to people 
in rich societies. Eradication of the conditions that bring about or perpetuate extreme poverty and 
destitution in the poor countries is not of particular interest to the people in rich societies. In the 
poor countries, though, the amounts that people are willing to accept as compensation for a 
failure to achieve the MDGs are comparable to what would have been 0.7% proportion of the 
income of the rich countries for international aid. Finally, political leaders need to ensure the 
success of the MDG because the results suggest that doing so is cheaper compared to the costs of 
letting the MDGs fail.  
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Table 1: Standard of living, average income (in US dollars) 
Source of data: World Development Indicators online 
 
Notes: 
 
1. The ‘average of upper income’ is the period average of all rich OECD-member countries, while 
the ‘average of low income’ is the period average of all low income countries.  
2. Current US dollar is used instead of US dollar purchasing power parity (PPP) because the latter 
tends to inflate the magnitude of income of countries that do not have sizeable tradable sectors, 
making poor countries appear ‘richer’. 
Rich countries 1990 1995 2000 2005 
  Japan       24,432        41,834        36,789        35,627  
  Norway       27,732        34,156        37,472        65,324  
  Switzerland       35,491        44,871        34,787        50,083  
  United States       23,064        27,574        34,606        42,534  
       Av. of Group        27,680        37,109        35,914        48,392  
       Av. of Upper income       19,317        25,239        25,871        34,301  
0.7% of GDP Per Capita     
  Japan 171 293 258 249 
  Norway 194 239 262 457 
  Switzerland 248 314 244 351 
  United States 161 193 242 298 
     Average of Group  194 260 251 339 
     Average of Upper income 135 177 181 240 
Poor countries 1990 1995 2000 2005 
  Ethiopia           250            133            125            165  
  Mali           280            258            230            448  
  Rwanda           361            238            218            266  
  Zambia           416            382            309            610  
     Average of Group            327            253            221            372  
     Average of Low income           284            249            253            333  
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Table 3: Valuation of preferences for MDG (in US dollars) 
Basic results: Rich Countries MDG1 MDG2 MDG4 MDG5 MDG7 Average 
Marginal value share to GDP (%)  6.5  8.2 7.3 7.3 
Japan  2,302  2,935 2,592 2,609 
Norway  4,220  5,381 4,753 4,785 
Switzerland  3,235  4,125 3,644 3,668 
United States  2,748  3,503 3,095 3,115 
    Average of Group  3,126  3,986 3,521 3,544 
    Average of Upper Income  2,216  2,825 2,496 2,512 
Robustness Results       
Marginal value share to GDP (%)  5.8  7.4 6.5 6.6 
Japan        2,057         2,643        2,322       2,340  
Norway        3,771         4,846        4,258       4,291  
Switzerland        2,891         3,715        3,264       3,290  
United States        2,455         3,155        2,772       2,794  
    Average of Group        2,793         3,590        3,154       3,179  
    Average of Upper Income        1,980         2,544        2,236       2,253  
Basic results: Poor Countries MDG1 MDG2 MDG4 MDG5 MDG7 Average 
Marginal value share to GDP   (%) 41.3 21.2 26.4 48.7 53.6 38.2 
Marginal value share to GDP1 (%) 0.45 0.23 0.29 0.53 0.58 0.41 
Marginal value share to GDP2 (%) 0.40 0.21 0.26 0.47 0.52 0.37 
Ethiopia 68 35 44 80 88 63 
Mali 185 95 118 218 240 171 
Rwanda 110 57 70 130 142 102 
Zambia 252 130 161 297 327 233 
    Average of Group 154 79 98 181 199 142 
    Average of Low Income 137 71 88 162 178 127 
Robustness Results       
Marginal value share to GDP   (%) 35.5 17.4 20.1 40.5 47.0 32.1 
Marginal value share to GDP1 (%) 0.38 0.19 0.22 0.44 0.51 0.35 
Marginal value share to GDP2 (%) 0.34 0.17 0.20 0.39 0.46 0.31 
Ethiopia 59 29 33 67 78 53 
Mali 159 78 90 182 210 144 
Rwanda 94 46 54 108 125 85 
Zambia 216 106 123 247 287 196 
    Average of Group         132            65            75          151          175          120  
    Average of Low Income 118 58 67 135 156 107 
 
Notes: 
1. MV=
Y
Z
h
h
obtains the share of the willingness-to-accept to GDP per capita and Y
h
h
Y
Z obtains the absolute 
dollar amounts. Statistically insignificant results are not reported in the table. Nonetheless, the coefficients 
on MDG items 1 and 3 are positive. The willingness-to-accept values are $1,668-$1,898 for MDG1 (or about 
7% of GDP per capita) and $2,156-$2,374 for MDG4 (or about 9% of GDP per capita). Regression results 
are available in Appendices 1 and 2.  
2. GDP1 is group average of rich countries GDP per capita and GDP2 is all rich countries average GDP per 
capita. 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A.1: Ordered probit regression results for rich countries 
 Baseline MDG1 MDG2 MDG4 MDG5 MDG7 
 GDP per capita  1.0470 1.0539 1.0567 1.0661 1.0383 
  15.150 15.228 15.213 15.338 15.013 
Z  0.0341 0.0680 0.0494 0.0878 0.0755 
  1.0980 2.1319 1.5794 2.7507 2.4648 
Age -0.0485 -0.0479 -0.0481 -0.0481 -0.0480 -0.0481 
 -8.1637 -8.0581 -8.0779 -8.0803 -8.0695 -8.0825 
Age-square 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 8.8647 8.7673 8.7760 8.7933 8.7597 8.7728 
Gender -0.1063 -0.1169 -0.1160 -0.1159 -0.1130 -0.1148 
 -3.4598 -3.7919 -3.7658 -3.7601 -3.6621 -3.7237 
Ex-married -0.2282 -0.2870 -0.2891 -0.2856 -0.2883 -0.2913 
 -4.4747 -5.6029 -5.6439 -5.5781 -5.6295 -5.6840 
Widowhood -0.2290 -0.2595 -0.2627 -0.2594 -0.2598 -0.2633 
 -3.2179 -3.6401 -3.6838 -3.6393 -3.6440 -3.6917 
Single -0.2638 -0.2947 -0.2937 -0.2925 -0.2938 -0.2974 
 -5.7531 -6.4112 -6.3886 -6.3620 -6.3906 -6.4685 
Tertiary education 0.3727 0.2709 0.2621 0.2691 0.2598 0.2729 
 2.3439 1.6999 1.6437 1.6886 1.6295 1.7126 
Secondary education 0.2706 0.2252 0.2198 0.2230 0.2171 0.2269 
 1.7303 1.4383 1.4033 1.4240 1.3860 1.4490 
Primary education 0.1829 0.1198 0.1190 0.1188 0.1193 0.1239 
 1.1542 0.7546 0.7498 0.7485 0.7518 0.7803 
Unemployed -0.4256 -0.3818 -0.3830 -0.3812 -0.3814 -0.3817 
 -3.8727 -3.4711 -3.4815 -3.4656 -3.4676 -3.4700 
Income decile 0.0970 0.0903 0.0901 0.0906 0.0907 0.0904 
 13.416 12.441 12.417 12.482 12.497 12.456 
Pseudo R2 0.0224 0.0359 0.0361 0.0360 0.0363 0.0362 
 
Notes: 
 
1. N= 4,611 observations.  
2. Numbers below the coefficients are z-statistics. 
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Table B.1: Ordered probit regression results for poor countries 
 Baseline MDG1 MDG2 MDG4 MDG5 MDG7 
 GDP per capita  0.3841 0.3758 0.3809 0.3890 0.4052 
  13.914 13.625 13.722 14.054 14.519 
Z  0.1585 0.0798 0.1004 0.1895 0.2170 
  3.6975 2.0072 2.5771 4.3634 6.1855 
Age -0.0216 -0.0161 -0.0162 -0.0162 -0.0162 -0.0169 
 -3.9857 -2.9550 -2.9811 -2.9760 -2.9719 -3.1035 
Age-square 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 4.0384 2.9644 3.0104 3.0108 3.0197 3.1251 
Gender -0.0181 -0.0233 -0.0237 -0.0229 -0.0223 -0.0234 
 -0.6673 -0.8591 -0.8716 -0.8427 -0.8212 -0.8610 
Ex-married -0.0333 -0.0597 -0.0560 -0.0544 -0.0622 -0.0452 
 -0.5210 -0.9336 -0.8765 -0.8503 -0.9733 -0.7068 
Widowhood -0.2080 -0.2284 -0.2276 -0.2252 -0.2318 -0.2175 
 -3.3609 -3.6869 -3.6750 -3.6353 -3.7420 -3.5105 
Single -0.1090 -0.0701 -0.0674 -0.0654 -0.0701 -0.0728 
 -2.9824 -1.9092 -1.8358 -1.7825 -1.9105 -1.9838 
Tertiary education 0.2506 0.2458 0.2523 0.2503 0.2429 0.2555 
 3.6026 3.5268 3.6212 3.5920 3.4840 3.6695 
Secondary education 0.1282 0.1149 0.1184 0.1209 0.1114 0.1240 
 3.5398 3.1684 3.2628 3.3373 3.0686 3.4244 
Primary education 0.0815 0.1158 0.1202 0.1231 0.1167 0.1225 
 2.4141 3.4092 3.5411 3.6274 3.4372 3.6114 
Unemployed 0.0330 -0.0534 -0.0502 -0.0528 -0.0557 -0.0484 
 0.9869 -1.5657 -1.4704 -1.5472 -1.6333 -1.4203 
Income decile 0.1556 0.1499 0.1495 0.1496 0.1492 0.1505 
 23.879 22.904 22.850 22.868 22.805 22.998 
Pseudo R2 0.0281 0.0356 0.0353 0.0354 0.0358 0.0366 
 
Notes: 
 
1. N= 6,041 observations.  
2. Numbers below the coefficients are z-statistics. 
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Table A.2: Robustness test of ordered probit regression for rich countries 
  Baseline MDG1 MDG2 MDG4 MDG5 MDG7 
GDP per capita  1.0338 1.0406 1.0420 1.0517 1.0271 
  14.922 14.995 14.956 15.085 14.822 
Z  0.0252 0.0600 0.0403 0.0780 0.0669 
  0.8057 1.8693 1.2816 2.4307 2.1670 
Citizenship – local  0.0694 0.0713 0.0687 0.0713 0.0727 
  1.5104 1.5520 1.4968 1.5527 1.5805 
Citizenship – national  0.0957 0.0952 0.0955 0.0913 0.0941 
  1.4837 1.4765 1.4804 1.4142 1.4586 
Citizenship – global  0.0997 0.0960 0.0988 0.0949 0.0939 
  2.8283 2.7259 2.8095 2.6985 2.6648 
Age -0.0485 -0.0491 -0.0492 -0.0492 -0.0492 -0.0493 
 -8.1637 -8.2492 -8.2638 -8.2653 -8.2535 -8.2670 
Age-square 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 8.8647 8.9234 8.9269 8.9424 8.9099 8.9231 
Gender -0.1063 -0.1232 -0.1221 -0.1222 -0.1192 -0.1209 
 -3.4598 -3.9895 -3.9559 -3.9575 -3.8580 -3.9161 
Ex-married -0.2282 -0.2825 -0.2844 -0.2816 -0.2838 -0.2863 
 -4.4747 -5.5080 -5.5439 -5.4898 -5.5330 -5.5778 
Widowhood -0.2290 -0.2572 -0.2602 -0.2572 -0.2577 -0.2608 
 -3.2179 -3.6067 -3.6486 -3.6079 -3.6139 -3.6559 
Single -0.2638 -0.2832 -0.2823 -0.2816 -0.2825 -0.2855 
 -5.7531 -6.1376 -6.1162 -6.0997 -6.1207 -6.1859 
Tertiary education 0.3727 0.2505 0.2420 0.2488 0.2402 0.2515 
 2.3439 1.5702 1.5163 1.5596 1.5055 1.5773 
Secondary education 0.2706 0.2059 0.2007 0.2042 0.1986 0.2068 
 1.7303 1.3130 1.2792 1.3017 1.2660 1.3186 
Primary education 0.1829 0.1052 0.1045 0.1047 0.1051 0.1086 
 1.1542 0.6617 0.6575 0.6588 0.6610 0.6831 
Unemployed -0.4256 -0.3721 -0.3731 -0.3717 -0.3721 -0.3721 
 -3.8727 -3.3788 -3.3880 -3.3748 -3.3789 -3.3784 
Income decile 0.0970 0.0901 0.0900 0.0904 0.0905 0.0902 
 13.416 12.415 12.393 12.448 12.463 12.428 
Pseudo R2 0.0224 0.0371 0.0372 0.0371 0.0374 0.0373 
 
Notes: 
 
1. N= 4,611 observations.  
2. Numbers below the coefficients are z-statistics. 
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Table B.2: Robustness test of ordered probit regression for poor countries 
 Baseline MDG1 MDG2 MDG4 MDG5 MDG7 
GDP per capita  0.4073 0.4004 0.4035 0.4106 0.4252 
  14.449 14.199 14.236 14.535 14.949 
Z  0.1444 0.0697 0.0811 0.1664 0.1997 
  3.3518 1.7453 2.0569 3.7886 5.6363 
Citizenship – local  -0.0877 -0.0811 -0.0826 -0.0875 -0.0915 
  -1.4060 -1.3007 -1.3242 -1.4028 -1.4681 
Citizenship – national  0.1595 0.1578 0.1490 0.1417 0.1403 
  2.1941 2.1678 2.0395 1.9437 1.9266 
Citizenship – global  0.1789 0.1850 0.1831 0.1764 0.1687 
  4.2366 4.3838 4.3382 4.1731 3.9889 
Age -0.0216 -0.0161 -0.0162 -0.0162 -0.0162 -0.0168 
 -3.9857 -2.9496 -2.9799 -2.9724 -2.9638 -3.0796 
Age-square 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 4.0384 2.9402 2.9863 2.9854 2.9919 3.0866 
Gender -0.0181 -0.0217 -0.0220 -0.0214 -0.0209 -0.0219 
 -0.6673 -0.7983 -0.8108 -0.7894 -0.7709 -0.8053 
Ex-married -0.0333 -0.0432 -0.0393 -0.0385 -0.0461 -0.0314 
 -0.5210 -0.6749 -0.6141 -0.6019 -0.7198 -0.4903 
Widowhood -0.2080 -0.2126 -0.2114 -0.2102 -0.2168 -0.2045 
 -3.3609 -3.4247 -3.4061 -3.3863 -3.4912 -3.2930 
Single -0.1090 -0.0691 -0.0665 -0.0648 -0.0688 -0.0715 
 -2.9824 -1.8811 -1.8122 -1.7648 -1.8741 -1.9469 
Tertiary education 0.2506 0.2436 0.2494 0.2484 0.2419 0.2533 
 3.6026 3.4931 3.5762 3.5620 3.4676 3.6347 
Secondary education 0.1282 0.1208 0.1240 0.1264 0.1180 0.1292 
 3.5398 3.3238 3.4103 3.4807 3.2433 3.5588 
Primary education 0.0815 0.1220 0.1260 0.1284 0.1228 0.1279 
 2.4141 3.5871 3.7073 3.7781 3.6112 3.7643 
Unemployed 0.0330 -0.0421 -0.0391 -0.0418 -0.0449 -0.0387 
 0.9869 -1.2305 -1.1422 -1.2215 -1.3117 -1.1301 
Income decile 0.1556 0.1496 0.1493 0.1494 0.1489 0.1502 
 23.879 22.799 22.757 22.763 22.700 22.873 
Pseudo R2 0.0281 0.0367 0.0364 0.0364 0.0368 0.0375 
 
Notes: 
 
1. N= 6,041 observations.  
2. Numbers below the coefficients are z-statistics 
 
 
